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SHAW v. HUNT
116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996)
United States Supreme Court
I. FACTS
Residents in North Carolina brought suit against
the U.S. Attorney General alleging that North
Carolina's redistricting plan contained impermissible
racial gerrymandering.' A three-judge panel of the
United States District Court for the Eastern2 District of North Carolina dismissed the action.
In 1993, the Court in Shaw v. Reno3 held that
"plaintiffs whose complaint alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate and bizarrelooking districts on the basis of race stated a claim
for relief under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."4 Furthermore, the Court
held that bizarre voting districts, unexplainable in
terms other than race were subject to strict scrutiny.5 Hence, the Court stated that redistricting plans
must be "narrowly
tailored to further a compelling
6
state interest.
The Court reversed and remanded to the district court for consideration of the claim.7 On remand, the district court held that the plan's lines
were drawn to produce districts which reflected the
racial makeup of the populations within them. Although the plan was race-based, the Court found
' Suit was brought against the assistantAttorney General, various state officials and agencies.
I3 Shaw v. Reno, 861 F.Supp. 408 (1994).

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S.630 (1993).
4Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1899 (1996). (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)). The Court in
United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2436 (1995), lim-

ited standing in racial redistricting cases to those persons
residing within the particular district(s) at issue.The Hays
Court did make an exception for individuals residing outside the state who demonstrated a specific harm suffered.
5 Id.
6
1d.
7
1d.
842 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988) under section 2 North
Carolina must show that a minority group is "sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district," the group is "politically cohesive"; and that the white majority votes sufficiently in a
bloc to prevent the candidate preferred by the minority
group. All relevant circumstances must be consider by the
court and based upon the totality of the circumstances
the protect class must be found to "have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice."

that it was narrowly tailored to further the state's
compelling interest in complying with sections 28
and 59 of the Voting Rights Act.' 0
II. HOLDING
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision,
held that North Carolina's redistricting plan violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."
III. ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
In Mi!!er v. Johnson,'2 the Court held that a racially gerrymandered districting scheme was constitutionally suspect. If race was found to be the dominant and controlling consideration in redistricting,
the classification would be unconstitutional, regardless of whether the classification was benign or remedial.' 3 A plaintiff could prove a race-based motive by using either circumstantial evidence relating
to the district's shape and demographics or direct
evidence connected to the legislature's purpose. 4 A
state could overcome a suspect classification if it
showed a legitimate and compelling interest) 5 In
942 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988) under section 5 North

Carolina has two options. North Carolina can submit a
redistricting plan to the Attorney General or file it with
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in order to gain approval of a redistricting plan.
Upon submission to the Attorney General the plan will
either be approved or disapproved. If within 60 days the
Attorney General has failed to give a response, the plan is
approved by default. In the context of a redistricting plan
submitted to the United States District Court of the District of Columbia, a three judge panel must sit to hear
challenges brought by oppositions to the plan in areas
stipulated by the Act.
10Shaw v.Hunt, 116 S.Ct. at 1899-1900 (citing Shaw
v. Reno, 861 F.Supp. 408, 473-474 (1994)). See also 42

U.S.C. § 1973, 1973c.
I Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S.Ct. at 1899-1900 (citing Shaw
v. Reno, 861 F. Supp. 408,474 (1994)). See also 42 U.S.C.

§ 1973, 1973c.
12115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995).
3

Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488-2491
(1995).
'4
's

Id. at 2488.
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494

order to be a compelling interest, the discrimination at issue must be "identified discrimination." 6
Moreover, the state must have a "strong basis in evidence" to conclude that a redistricting program was
necessary. 7 However, this"compelling interest" must
be "specifically and narrowly tailored" in order to
meet strict scrutiny. 8

The Court agreed in Shaw v. Reno that the
district's shape, demographics, and legislative purpose all showed that race was a dominant and controlling factor in the redistricting plan.' 9 Therefore,
the standards set forth in Miller applied to North
Carolina's redistricting plan. Revisiting the issue in
Hunt, Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the plurality of the Court, invalidated the redistricting plan
using the guidelines established in Miller. 20
North Carolina asserted three distinct compelling interests to sustain the creation of a black majority district: "to eradicate the effects of past and
present discrimination; to comply with section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, and to comply with section 2
of that Act."2
A. EFFECTS OF PAST AND PRESENT
DISCRIMINATION
In order for North Carolina's assertion of eradicating past or present discrimination to rise to a compelling interest, its redistricting scheme had to meet
two conditions before warranting racial distinctions.2?
First, past or present discrimination had to be "identified" with specificity before relief based on race
could be granted.? Second, North Carolina must
have had a "strong basis in evidence" to conclude
that the redistricting scheme was necessary.24
In the present case, the Court found a discrepancy between North Carolina's proffered purpose
of eliminating past discrimination and its use of race
in the redistricting plan. To support its claim of remedying past discrimination, North Carolina relied
on two reports prepared by a social scientist and a
(1989).
16 Id. at 469.
"7 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 274275 (1986).
18 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280.
"gShaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. at 1901.
20

Id.

2

'Id. at 1902.

22Id.

2 Id. (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 499-506 (1989)).

24

Id. at 1903 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEd., 476
U.S. 267, 277 (1986)).

historian. 2 However, the reports were dated after
North Carolina's General Assembly had adopted the
redistricting plan. 26 The Court found it difficult to
believe that the legislature had the historical and
social-science data before them when considering
the creation of the new district.2 7 The Court determined that, instead, North Carolina's legislators had
relied impermissibly on their personal experiences
alone: "A generalized assertion of past discrimination in a particular industry or region is not adequate
because it provides no guidance for a legislative body
to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks
to remedy."28 Therefore, the Court held that North
Carolina failed to prove that any past or present discrimination existed.
B. SECTION 5 OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT
The Court also acknowledged that Miller left
open the question of whether compliance with the
Voting Rights Act alone could be a compelling interest under the proper circumstances?29 However,
the Hunt Court noted in Miller that3 section 530 did
not require race-based redistricting. '
The Hunt Court held that it would not reach
the issue again of whether compliance with the Voting Rights Act could be a compelling interest; for
North Carolina's creation of "an additional majority-black district was not required under a correct
reading of § 5 .... ,"32In North Carolina's submission to the Department of Justice, North Carolina's
General Assembly explained that it did not initially
create a second minority district in order "to keep
precincts whole, to avoid dividing counties into more
than two districts, and to give black voters a fair
amount of influence by creating at least one district
that was majority black in voter registration and by
creating a substantial number of other districts in
which black voters would exercise a significant influence over the choice of congressmen." 33 More2

1Id. (citing H. Watson, Race and Politics in North
Carolina, 1865-1994, but the report was not completed
until after Shaw v.Reno which was heard before the Court

in 1993).
26
1d.
27 Id.

2

1Id. at 1902-1903. (quoting Richmond v. IA. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989)).
291d. at 1903.
3042 U.S.C. §1973c. For full description see supra

note319.

Id. See also Miller, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2491 (1995).

32 Id.

33

Id. at 1904.

over, North Carolina pointed out that no consensus
of African-American and Native-American voting
patterns existed which established the creation of a
minority district. 34 Additionally, creating a black
decrease black
majority district, in practice, would
3
influence in four other districts.
Miller recognized that a state's policy of adhering to traditional districting principles, as opposed
to unlimited creation of majority-minority districts,
did not alone create the inference of discrimination
on the basis of race.3 6 Therefore, a redistricting plan
"[could] violate section 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or
color as to violate the Constitution."37 As in Mille,
the Hunt Court concluded that compliance with section 5 and the Department of Justice's authority was
an improper basis for North Carolina's maximization policy. 8 The Court held that North Carolina's
creation of an additional majority-black district was
not a remedy narrowly tailored to North Carolina's
professed interest in avoiding section 5 liability.
C. SECTION 2 OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
In order to mount a section 231 challenge, the
plaintiff must allege manipulation and dilution of4a0
minority population in a single-member district.
The plaintiff must show that the manipulation of
the district lines "fragments politically cohesive minority voters among several districts or packs them
into one district or a small number of districts, and
thereby dilutes the voting strength of members of
the minority population."41
To prevail on a section 2 claim, North Carolina
must have proved that the minority group was "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district."4 ' Second, the minority group must have been "politically
cohesive."43 Third, North Carolina had to prove that
the white majority "usually . . .defeat[ed] the
34Id.

(citing Shaw v.Reno, 861 F. Supp. 408, 480-

481(1994)).
35
Id.
36
MiUerv. Johnson, 115 S. Ct.2475, 2492 (1995).
37
Mile, 115 S. Ct. at 2492.
38Shaw v.Hunt,116 S. Ct. 1894, 1904 (1996).
3942 U.S.C. §1973b. For fMll description see supra note

8.

40

1d. at 1905.

41Id. (citing Johnson v.De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647,

2655 (1994)).
41Id. at 1905 (quoting Thornburg v.Gingles,478 U.S.

30, 50-51 (1986)).

minority's preferred candidate." 44 Based upon the
totality of the circumstances, the Court ultimately
had to find that members of a protected class "ha[d]
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice."45
The Court assumed arguendo that compliance
with section 2 could be a compelling interest, and
that "a second majority-minority district was needed
in order not to violate § 2 . ... "46 The Court, however, held that the North Carolina plan did not survive strict scrutiny because the means, race-based
redistricting, was not narrowly tailored to achieve
4
the ends, compliance with section 2. 1

The Court conceded that it could find no clear
guidelines as to how close the means and ends chosen must be in redistricting cases.48 However, the
Court expected the action taken by the legislature
to substantially address or achieve the asserted purpose.49Therefore, the action by the legislature must,
at the very least, "remedy the anticipated violation
or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored."'
North Carolina failed to assert that the district
was "geographically compact."s' Instead, it contended
that "once a legislature has a strong basis in evidence"
of a section 2 violation, "it may draw a majorityminority district anywhere," even if the district is
not compact.-2
The Court found North Carolina's argument
unpersuasive. Based upon the record, the Court
stated that the newly created district had no "geographically compact" minority group to warrant a
remedy under section 2. 3 If a section 2 violation
had existed, a majority-minority district still could
not be drawn anywhere.r' The Court determined
that North Carolina's assertion was implausible because any discrimination in a particular geographical area would go unchecked if a minority-majority
district was set up somewhere else in North Carolina.55 Therefore, the Court held that the redistricting plan was not narrowly tailored to North
43

Id.

44id.
451d

.

46Id.
47
ld.
48 Id.

49 Id. (citing Millerv. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2491

(1995)).
S'Id. at 1906.
5

1Id.

52

Id.
53

Id.

4Id.
55

Id.

Carolina's interest in 5complying
with section 2 of
6
the Voting Rights Act.
IV. DISSENT
Justice Stevens dissented in part due to the
majority's tendency to view legitimate attempts by
states to correct past discriminatory wrongs against
historically disadvantaged minority groups "with the
same hostility that is appropriate for oppressive and
exclusionary abuses of political power."5 7 Stevens felt
that party politics, not race, was the "predominant"
concern in Shaw v. Hunt, and that the majority's

opinion was less a barrier "against racial discrimination than.., a means by which state residents may
second-guess legislative districting in federal court
for partisan ends."58 The plaintiff-intervenors in this
case were Repubicans. Stevens indicated that, based
upon the record, these plaintiff-intervenors were
upset due to the dominance of the Democratic representation in Congress. 9The Republicans made no
opposition to the initial creation of more than one
majority-minority districts. 60 However, once North
Carolina designed a district that would have preserved Democratic incumbency, the plaintiff-intervenors have joined the racial gerrymandering challenge. 6' According to Stevens, Shaw v. Hunt established a standard by which allegations of racial gerrymandering would become a "means by which unsuccessful majority-race candidates, and their parties, will seek to obtain judicially what they could
not obtain electorally."62
To rebut the majority's argument that the redistricting plan did not have a "geographically compact" minority group, Stevens pointed out that North
Carolina makes no such geographical compactness
requirement in its own electorial districts.' Although
the redistricting plan "may give rise to an inference

56

1d. at 1907.

57 Id.

58
1d. at
59

1908.
1d.
60Id.
61Id. Stevens also noted that the plaintiff-intervenors
joined the racial gerrymandering suit only after their partisan gerrymandering suit was dismissed for failure to state
a claim.
62
1d.
6id. at 1915.
6
'Id.
0 Id.

'6Id. at 1916. Stevens found that 1)the incumbent's
interest in staying in the same district and 2) the interest

that traditional districting principles were subordinated to race in determining its boundaries, it cannot fairly be said to prove that conclusion in light of
the dear evidence demonstrating race-neutral explanations for the district's tortured shape."r Stevens
found that the omission of a geographic compactness requirement indicated that the creation of a
noncompact district was not a deviation from North
Carolina's district-creating principle. 6 In fact,
Stevens found that nothing in the record revealed
that race was the dominant factor in the redistricting plan. Instead, he found two race-neutral criteria
in forming the districts.66

After assuming, as the majority held, that strict
scrutiny applied, Stevens found that North Carolina had three compelling interests. First, some of
the North Carolina legislators felt that the history
of poor race relations in their state's history would
best be amended by facilitating African-American
participation in voting and by increasing representation of African-Americans in Congress. 67 Second,
regardless of whether section 5 was violated, North
Carolina's interest in overcoming the Attorney
General's objection was acceptable for the second
majority-minority district creation." Third, North
Carolina's interest in avoiding the "expense and unpleasantness" of section 2 litigation was a compel69
ling interest.
Justice Stevens also stated that the majority
failed to adequately address the issue of plaintiff's
standing.70 According to Stevens, the majority had
failed to show the nature of the plaintiff's constitutional challenge or why the issue before the Court
7
should be considered an equal protection problem. '
The majority's vagueness, in Steven's opinion, allowed the plaintiff to assert pretextual objections
and to avoid revealing their real basis for objecting,
partisan politics.72

in placing rural voters in one district and urban voters in
another, were race-neutral reasons for creating the districts.

67

Id. at 1918.
68Id.
0 Id.
70

Id. at 1907, 1910-1911. For further discussion on
the standing issue, see Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475,
2497-2499 (1995). See also United States v. Hays, 115 S.
Ct. 2431,
2436 (1995).
71
1d. at 1907-1908.
72
Id. Justice Stevens asserted that the Court's ruling
would set a bad precedent. After Shaw v. Hunt, a majority candidate who lost would still have the courts to
achieve what he could not through an election.

V. CONCLUSION
In Millerv.Johnson andShaw v. Hunt,the Court
faithfully required any racial element as a minor consideration in the context of redistricting. For years,
redistricting was a familiar tool of those who wished
to suppress the vote of racial minorities. Many of
the redistricting plans of the past had irregular
shapes. Besides being created to dilute the minority
vote, many districts were, and still are, drawn for
political reasons. However, in the context of Shaw
v. Hunt, an assertion of race-based considerations
overshadowed and obscured any political purposes
for redistricting.
It appears from cases like Millerv. Johnson and
Shaw v. Hunt that the Department of Justice and
the Court are caught in a tug-of-war when it comes
to compliance with the Voting Rights Act in the
context of redistricting. The DOJ knows that there
are problem areas where minority groups are not
being represented adequately. The states in which
the problems exist, like Georgia and North Carolina, also acknowledge the lack of representation.
The DOJ puts pressure on the problem areas to
comply with the Act. The only sensible solution is
to redistrict in order to gain better minority representation. Unfortunately, while the remnants of past
discrimination still exist, the Court has adopted a
color-blind attitude.The Court requires specific evidence of state action in causing minority voter dilution. In many cases, evidence of the source of manipulation of the minority votes is lost over time.
Most legislatures rely on personal knowledge. Unfortunately, under Shaw v. Hunt, personal knowledge is not good enough.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed to
insure that one's race would not be a barrier to one's
freedom to express his or her political voice Shaw
v. Hunt adds several elements to the ever-growing
racial redistricting precedent. While Shaw v. Hunt
mirrors the reasoning in Miller,it also takes a step
further toward the total exclusion of race in all redistricting considerations.

The prudence of holding redistricting plans to
the same level of scrutiny as affirmative action programs is questionable. Redistricting plans like the
one in Huntand affirmative action programs share a
common purpose of remedying past discrimination.
The Court now requires, in order for affirmative action programs to survive strict scrutiny, direct evidence of discrimination and present harm. Allegations of past discrimination will not alone allow a
redistricting program to survive strict scrutiny.
Several elements within the redistricting cases,
like Miller and Shaw v. Hunt, warrant a lower level
of scrutiny by the Court. The original purpose of
the Voting Rights Act was to give equal opportunity
for voting and representation. The DOJ, after investigation, finds violations of the Act and pressures
the violating state to fix the problem. The state, one
would reasonably think, is in the best position to
eliminate voting barriers. However, the Court will
not allow these changes without direct evidence of
discrimination. No general assertions by legislatures
of past discrimination will be sufficient. Instead, the
legislature must identify a specific harm and narrowly tailor the remedy. The Court fails to realize
that discrimination is institutional. In most cases,
pinpointing exactly where the harm ends and the
remedy begins is impossible.
After Shaw v. Hunt,legislatures will find it very
hard to survive judicial scrutiny if its considerations
are not color-blind. Yet color-blind legislation may
not be realistic in this context. Even today, there
are those who are not represented due to oppressive district-drawing of the past. If the past is to be
remedied by social advances in the present, how
should legislatures to proceed? If the future laws
are color-blind then past discrimination, based on
race-guided laws, cannot be realistically remedied.
Clearly, Stevens did not think total exclusion of race
was possible. With state legislatures' hands being tied
by the Court, a state will rarely if ever satisfy the
DOJ under the Voting Rights Act.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Eugene Butler

